Britain’s Response to the Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean by Mulvey, Gareth
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Britain’s Response to the Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean
Citation for published version:
Mulvey, G, Britain’s Response to the Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean, 2015, Web publication/site,
European Futures, Edinburgh.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publisher Rights Statement:
© 2015 Gareth Mulvey. Published under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International) License
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  
European Futures | Article No 62                                                                         Page 1 of 4 
Article No 62  
 
 
Britain’s Response to the Refugee Crisis in the 
Mediterranean 
 
Author(s): Gareth Mulvey 
 
Permalink: http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-2449 
 
Publication: 16 December 2015 
 
Article text: 
 
The UK Government’s approach to the current refugee crisis in Europe is a 
continuation of policies intended to discourage migration to Britain, writes Gareth 
Mulvey. He argues that this strategy will do little to address the situation, may 
cause tension between London and the devolved administrations and could hamper 
relations with the rest of the EU in this period of renegotiation of membership. 
 
What is most striking about the UK Government’s ‘response’ to the ‘crisis’ in the 
Mediterranean (the term crisis is used here due to its prevalence, though not 
accepted uncritically)  is the fact that, for it, that was not where the crisis was. The 
crisis for Britain was in Calais. Despite having argued for the end of the Mare 
Nostrum search-and-rescue operation run and paid for by the Italian Government, 
the relatively small number of people trying to get into the UK from Calais was the 
real focus of attention. 
 
It was these people who were referred to as swarms, and government action 
concentrated on fortifying borders, primarily through building fences around and 
deploying dogs within the Eurotunnel compound. However, there are clearly links 
between the two crises from the government’s perspective and these should be 
located historically. 
 
What has underpinned UK Government thinking on unwanted migration (mostly 
refugees but also low skilled migrants from outside of the EU) for much of the last 
two decades has been a view that Britain is a magnet for many of the world’s 
people, that huge numbers would come given the opportunity, and that the reasons 
for this concern pull rather than push factors. 
 
This has led to very narrow governmental thinking, aimed at reducing the pull by 
making life in Britain more difficult as well as externalising border controls to 
actively prevent people from getting to the UK. Absent has been any conception of 
why people leave their countries of origin, always crucial but of obvious importance 
in the current crisis. Existing literature provides practically no evidence for pull 
factors in the case of refugee movements, yet policy continues to be predicated on 
this. 
 
The UK Government’s response to Mare Nostrum in 2014 was consistent with this 
approach, focusing entirely on the alleged pull. The argument was that saving lives 
in the Mediterranean acted as a pull factor and that people were encouraged to get 
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on boats because of the prospect of being rescued. The implicit solution was letting 
people drown as a disincentive to movement. 
 
Foreign Office Minister Baroness Anelay put it bluntly: ‘we do not support planned 
search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean’ due to the ‘unintended “pull 
factor”, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and 
thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths’. This proved factually 
wrong, with more people fleeing after the end of Mare Nostrum than in the year 
before. It was also subject to pointed criticism on moral grounds, that death as a 
behavioural disincentive could not be justified. 
 
As more refugees fled Syria and elsewhere and arrived on the shores of EU Member 
States, the UK Government took a firm approach that it would not assist in any EU-
wide resettlement. As other EU states struggled to cope with the numbers of 
refugees crossing their borders, the UK, being an island on the periphery of Europe 
was able, at least rhetorically, to keep the ‘problem’ at arm’s length. 
 
This was justified by emphasising that the UK aid budget supports refugees in 
camps in countries bordering Syria. Providing support in the region of origin but 
refusing access to the UK is a practice that can be traced back to the war in Kosovo, 
when the UK Government argued that taking refugees ‘would only have assisted 
Milosevic’s objectives’. It is worth adding that the ‘share’ of refugees supported by 
the so-called developed world has declined markedly in recent years, from 30 per 
cent in 2004 to just 14 per cent in 2014 (UNHCR). 
 
It seems likely that the UK Government assumed that existing hostility to migrants 
in public debates would result in support for the approach of taking no refugees 
from Syria. In fact, the public response compelled it to change its approach, from 
one emphasising aid but no refugees to one accepting the need to take part in 
refugee resettlement, however inadequate. 
 
The UK now aims to accommodate 20,000 Syrian refugees over the next five years, 
taking them from refugee camps close to Syria (by contrast Germany has now 
allowed almost one million asylum seekers to enter in 2015 alone, while Sweden has 
supported 100,000 in 2015). However, Britain will not contribute to helping to 
resettle those already in Europe, thus contributing nothing to solving the present 
‘crisis’. 
 
There is also a major contradiction in the government’s approach. It claims that its 
focus is on addressing the conditions that force people to flee through the aid 
budget (at last an acknowledgement of push factors). It also says that this is best 
done by targeted aid in the region of origin. However, at the same time, in order to 
maintain a tough stance, particularly regarding public money, it is drawing from the 
same aid budget to pay for those Syrians resettled in the UK. 
 
This means that the level of support in the region of origin will consequently fall, 
presumably pushing more people to flee to Europe where the UK will continue to 
refuse to help them. Indeed, it seems implausible that the recent decision to join in 
the bombing of Syria can do anything in the short term other than create more 
flight, at which point it seems that Britain will continue to abstain from helping 
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resettle movement that it has helped to create. This position has been challenged 
within Westminster and by devolved authorities. 
 
The relationship between the Scottish Government and the UK Government on 
migration-related issues is a complex one (see Tomas Hammar’s notion of 
immigration policy versus immigrant policy). It is certainly true that the rhetoric in 
Holyrood is different from that in Westminster. However, the Scottish Government 
in the present crisis has no control over who is able to get into the UK as either a 
resettled refugee or as an asylum seeker. However, it can ‘do’ immigrant policy 
differently in, for example, providing more equal access to education. 
 
Alongside Scottish local authorities, it has also suggested that a significant 
proportion of the 20,000 Syrians to arrive in the UK are resettled in Scotland (two 
groups have now arrived), while also highlighting the inadequacy of that number. It 
is not enough to suggest, as some have done, that the Scottish Government is able 
to be more liberal due simply to its lack of responsibility in terms of borders and 
access. 
 
There are broader differences between Westminster and Holyrood that speak to the 
present crisis. As an example, the Scottish Government’s white paper on 
independence was explicit about both seeking increased migration and removing a 
future Scottish Government from decision-making on asylum issues through the 
creation of an independent refugee determination agency. This approach, alongside 
far more positive rhetoric around the current refugee crisis, suggests differing 
politics rather than simply issues of who has control and power. 
 
In the meantime, an EU-wide crisis appears to be running straight into domestic UK 
politics in the form of the referendum on EU membership by end of 2017. Indeed, 
one of the questions that may arise in upcoming discussions between the UK 
Government and other EU states around the referendum will concern migration. It 
seems in the public debate that the only issue to be discussed in any renegotiation 
is migration. 
 
Nevertheless, while extolling the virtues of European solidarity (with France) as a 
rationale to vote to bomb Syria, the lack of any solidarity regarding refugees is part 
of the context in which the discussions will take place. How this plays out in the run 
up to the referendum will be a major test of the EU’s and Britain’s approach to the 
migration crisis. How both the discussions around Britain’s renegotiation and the 
result of the referendum impact on the relationships between Westminster and 
Holyrood will ensure a great deal of political intrigue in the years ahead. 
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